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TEACHING MORAL PERCEPTION AND MORAL
JUDGMENT IN LEGAL ETHICS COURSES: A DIALOGUE
ABOUT GOALS*
LISA G. LERMANW
We who toil in the fields of legal ethics are privileged to try to
educate our students about one of the most complex and rapidly
growing fields of American law during a two- or three-credit,
required, upper-level course that is widely regarded as "the dog
of the curriculum."' Many have written of the intractable diffi-
culties of teaching what should be a fascinating course.2 We re-
* In this Essay, Professor Lisa G. Lerman reports on the 1997 W.M. Keck
Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics proceeding concerning setting
goals for the teaching of professional responsibility. This proceeding occurred on
March 21, 1997. Panel members included Steven Hartwell, Professor of Law,
University of San Diego; Judith L. Maute, Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma;
Michael Millemann, Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law and Director of
the Clinical Law Program, University of Maryland; James E. Moliterno, Vice Dean,
Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Skills Program, The College of William
and Mary School of Law, Panel Moderator, Lizabeth Moody, Dean, Stetson Universi-
ty College of Law; and Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert E. & Marion D. Short Professor
of Law Emeritus, Notre Dame University. All remarks attributed to these
participants were made during the panel discussion unless otherwise indicated.
t Visiting Professor of Law, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.;
Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Public Policy Program, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, Washington, D.C. Thanks
to Dean Lizabeth Moody and to Professors Hartwell, Maute, and Shaffer for their
assistance in the preparation of this Essay. Thanks to Philip Schrag and Theresa
Fueutes for their suggestions on earlier drafts.
1. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37 (1995). Luban and Millemann described a
1979 survey that concluded that the standard required course in professional respon-
sibility is "despised by students, taught by overworked deans or underpaid adjuncts
and generally disregarded by the faculty at large." Id. at 37-38.
The authors reported anecdotal data suggesting that "the legal ethics course is
among the most difficult to teach; professors . . . do substantially worse on their
ethics evaluations than on evaluations for any other course they teach." Id. at 38.
2. See, e.g., James R. Elkins, Symptoms Exposed When Legalists Engage in Moral
Discourse: Reflections on the Difficulties of Talking Ethics, 17 VT. L. REV. 353 (1993)
(describing the difficulties involved in talking about ethics to law students); Ronald
M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Para-
dox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247 (discussing some of the difficulties involved in
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turn again and again in throngs to sit through conferences and
try to work out how we should teach these classes. Like rejected
children trying in vain to please narcissistic parents, we struggle
to overcome the cynicism and discontent that infects so many of
our classes. We produce a stream of creative teaching materials,
videotapes, simulations, and problems.3 We create experimental
first-year courses,4 simulation courses,' clinical ethics courses,6
intensive week-long courses, 7 multiple-semester programs inte-
grating the teaching of lawyering skills and legal ethics,' inter-
disciplinary courses,' specialized ethics courses,'0 and propos-
als for the pervasive teaching of ethics." The exchange of infor-
teaching ethics). These difficulties exist in business schools also. See Paul Wilkes,
The Tough Job of Teaching Ethics, N.Y. TImES, Jan. 22, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 1.
3. See Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on
Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 361 (identifying
the variety of materials available for legal ethics instruction).
4. See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experi-
ment, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 19 (describing the first-
year ethics curriculum at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Law).
5. See Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation: The
Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 37 (describing the simulation method for teaching ethics
used at Northwestern University School of Law).
6. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (discussing the courses taught by
Professors Millemann and Shaffer); see also Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and
the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 35-41 (1995-96) (discussing the development of clinical
legal ethics teaching).
7. See generally Carol Bensinger Liebman, The Profession of Law: Columbia Law
School's Use of Experiential Learning Techniques to Teach Professional Responsibility,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 73 (describing Columbia Law
School's intensive week-long ethics course for third-year students).
8. See James E. Moliterno, Teaching Legal Ethics in a Program of Comprehensive
Skills Development, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 149-62 (1995-96) (describing the legal
skills program at the William & Mary School of Law).
9. See David B. Wilkins, Redefining the 'Professional" in Professional Ethics: An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching Professionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 241, 247-57 (describing Harvard Law School's interdisci-
plinary approach to teaching ethics).
10. See Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New
Curriculum for a New Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at
193, 199-211 (describing specialized ethics courses offered at Fordham Law School).
11. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY
THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994) (providing a pervasive approach to legal ethics teach-
ing throughout the law school curriculum).
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mation draws us to meetings, as does our wish to keep up with
the burgeoning law governing lawyers. But for many of us, an-
other draw is the sense of failure and the quest to find a dif-
ferent formula for success.
This conversation about how to solve the terrible problems in
the teaching of professional responsibility is an old and rich dia-
logue. For over twenty years, experts have discussed the peda-
gogical challenges of this field and recommended experientially-
oriented teaching of ethics. 2 Pedagogical advances have oc-
curred, 3 and attitudes toward the teaching of professional re-
sponsibility have improved. 4  Still, at most schools, the
principal teaching about the legal profession and about the law
and ethical norms that govern lawyers occurs in a single, large,
upper-class, required course. 5 Despite endless innovation, nei-
12. The American Bar Association (ABA) amended its standards for accreditation
in 1974 to add a requirement for teaching of professional responsibility. See Warren
E. Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 391 (1980). Chief Justice Burger not-
ed a 1977 survey indicating that professional responsibility courses at one-third of
U.S. law schools were one-credit courses. See id. The Chief Justice observed that
clinical legal ethics courses facilitate the teaching of legal ethics but that they can
not accommodate all law students. See id. at 392-93. In any event, he concluded
that law schools should not segregate legal ethics in any single course. See id. at
393; see also Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249
(1975) (discussing the difficulties of teaching legal ethics and the desirability of ex-
panding clinical programs to teach the subject more effectively).
13. See generally Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing:
An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75 (1991)
(discussing contemporary approaches to the teaching of professional responsibility).
14. A large number of schools have increased the number of credits assigned to
professional responsibility courses. Compare Burger, supra note 12, at 391 (noting
that in 1977, one-third of schools assigned only one credit) with PROFESSIONALISM
COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASSN, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM app. B,
Law School Survey on Professionalism 39, 40 (1996) [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM
COMM.] (reporting that, in 1994, 67% of schools offered two- or three-credit profes-
sional responsibility classes and many other schools offered multiple credit classes).
Although most schools continue to offer professional responsibility as an upper-level
course, nineteen schools now require first-year students to take this course. See PRO-
FESSIONALISM COMM., supra, at 40.
15. A recent survey of law school ethics curricula obtained information from 131
law schools--74% of the accredited American schools. Over two-thirds of these law
schools require that upper-class students take a two- or three-credit course in profes-
sional responsibility. See PROFESSIONALISM COMM., supra note 14, at 39-40.
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ther teachers nor students are satisfied. 6
The first topic discussed at the 1997 W.M. Keck Foundation
Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics was setting goals for the
teaching of professional responsibility. In this Essay, I report
some of the ideas that were exchanged during the discussion
17
and comment on a few of them. I also will discuss experimental
teaching initiatives that some panelists have undertaken to im-
plement their articulated goals. Then I will comment on some of
the problems we encounter in setting goals for the teaching of
professional responsibility and on the implications of these ob-
servations for our law schools' curricula.
I. THE PANEL DISCUSSION: EMBRACING MUSHY PAP
Professor James Moliterno, who convened the conference and
moderated this panel discussion, urged the assembled group of
law professors to focus on an apparent disagreement among
some teachers about whether the primary goal of teaching pro-
fessional responsibility is to engage them in moral dialogue, to
try to contribute to the students' moral development-or to teach
the growing body of law governing lawyers. Professor Moliterno
reminded us that during the 1996 W.M. Keck Foundation Forum
on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, Professor Susan Koniak of Bos-
ton University asserted: "Any of this talk about moral develop-
ment is mushy pap... . [Instead] we must talk about the
law."8 Moliterno then invited comments from the panelists.
Professor Judith Maute teaches at the University of Oklaho-
ma. Her goals in teaching professional responsibility include
16. See supra note 1.
17. I was the designated "reporter" for this panel. As such, my role was to listen,
think, and take notes. In the first part of this Essay, I have variously quoted, para-
phrased, and summarized the comments of the panelists. I have tried to report the
panelists' ideas as accurately as possible, but in many instances I have not present-
ed their ideas in the order in which they occurred in the discussion. I apologize to
the panelists for any errors or omissions. I presented to each panelist a draft of the
parts of this Essay that reported his or her commentary and invited each to provide
any correction, expansion, etc. In some instances, the discussion as written is more
detailed or more fully developed than the conversation that formed the basis for this
Essay.
18. Susan P. Koniak, Remarks at the W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics (Mar. 22, 1996).
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providing students with a grounding in the law that governs
lawyers and engaging students in discussions about the moral
dilemmas that practicing lawyers face. Maute has taught this
course in both large class and seminar formats, and she has
used role-playing exercises and problems drawn from film, liter-
ature, and popular culture. For some years, she has been a
member of the Drafting Committee for the Multistate Profes-
sional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). Maute urged:
We must equip our students to practice "safe law"... . Our
students must be prepared to apply the law of lawyering,
because they will encounter it on a daily basis.... They
need to stay out of jail and avoid civil liability and [the]
harm that could come to them from blind devotion to a
client's interests. The analysis [they will need to do] is es-
sentially a legal analysis.
Maute asserted that law schools must provide "comprehensive
doctrinal exposure to the law of lawyering, so that when a law-
yer encounters an ethical dilemma, she can work out a solution
that is consistent with her values and will not result in her los-
ing her license to practice law." To Maute, a "'moral dialogue' is
one that a lawyer must have with her client and with reference
to the underlying substantive law." Maute stated:
What a lawyer can do in the course of representing a client is
limited by the underlying substantive law. That is, a lawyer
must define the legal options available to a client. This serves
as the essential starting place: moral dialogue between client
and lawyer [involves choosing] among the available options."9
To illustrate her conviction that teaching the law of lawyering
should be a top priority, Professor Maute described a recent Col-
orado case that exemplifies the type of professional disaster that
we hope to help our students avoid. In People v. Chappell," the
19. See also Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1066-67 (1984) ("A
client's rights as principal [in the attorney-client relationship] are determined by the
substantive law and the lawyer's duties.").
20. 927 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1996). Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University
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Colorado Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer after she helped a
client to flee the jurisdiction with her child.2' A court order pro-
hibited the client from removing the child from the jurisdiction.'
The client testified that "the [lawyer] advised her as her attorney
to stay, but as a mother to run."' After assisting the client in
emptying bank accounts and placing her belongings in storage,
the lawyer represented to the court that the child remained in the
jurisdiction.' She accepted an offer from the husband to contin-
ue child support payments, even though the court had granted
him custody of the child.'m The client later pleaded guilty to a
felony charge for having violated the court order.26 The court
held that the lawyer "used her license to violate the core ethical
and professional standards of her profession."27
Professor Maute urged that if the lawyer was convinced that
awarding custody of the child to the father would put the child
at risk of abuse, the lawyer should have "contested the court or-
der to the limits of the law." If those efforts failed, and "the law-
yer chose to become an active participant in the escape plan, she
should be ready to submit her resignation from the bar." She
would then be "an outlaw for justice in a system with a blind
spot to these domestic issues." This case could be the basis for a
classroom discussion about the legal limits on what a lawyer
may do and the divergence in some cases between what the law
requires and what conscience requires.
School of Law voiced a similar sentiment in an essay about his goals in teaching
professional responsibility:
I want students to understand the rules that will daily govern their pro-
fessional lives ... . I do not want to see their names in the advance
sheets after "In the Matter of .... " I cannot teach them to be honest if
they are not, but I can teach them the details that constitute honesty,
integrity, and loyalty in law practice.
Stephen Gillers, Getting Personal, LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995,
at 61, 63.
21. See Chappell, 927 P.2d at 829.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 829-30.
25. See id. at 830.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 831.
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Dean Lizabeth Moody of Stetson University College of Law
argued that the teaching of rules of law governing lawyers is
important, in part because no true consensus exists in the pro-
fession about the values of the profession. Dean Moody asserted:
"The challenge we are facing is that a central value in our pro-
fession is greed." She maintained that some values are or should
be mandatory for members of the legal profession and that the
law articulates some of these values. Perhaps she was suggest-
ing that teaching the law governing lawyers is one way to com-
bat the moral relativism that allows some attorneys to rational-
ize unethical conduct.
Professor Michael Millemann has been on the faculty of the
University of Maryland since 1973; he teaches both clinical and
traditional courses. Professor Millemann endorsed teaching what
Professor Koniak had described as "mushy pap."' Millemann
stated: "Mush is a nourishing combination of corn, oats, and
milk. We need to feed them mush. That is the richness of moral
development." Millemann agreed with Maute that students must
be taught the "increasingly complex law that has many different
sources" and that we "must teach competency, and teach our
students how to practice safely." Millemann noted, however, that
the ABA's model rule on competency lacks substance, because
"the Kutak Commission milked Rule 1.1 of all its content."29
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (relating Professor Koniak's use of
the term "mushy pap").
29. Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled "Compe-
tence," states: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Compe-
tent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.1 (1995). The 1979 Unofficial Pre-Circulation Draft of this rule stated in
part:
(b) A lawyer acts incompetently in a particular matter, if.
(i) He or she fails to use the knowledge, skill, preparation, and judgment
that a reasonably competent lawyer would use in the circumstances; and
(ii) The result of the lawyer's act or failure to act is substantial expense,
delay, harm, or risk of harm to a client or other person for whose benefit
the advice or assistance is provided.
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 19 (1994). As was the case for maly other model rules, the review and
revision process by which the Model Rules obtained ABA approval resulted in the
elimination of much specificity in the proposed standards. See id. at 3. Rule 1.1
illustrates this phenomenon.
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Some of the Model Rules are so general that law students can-
not be expected to learn much about standards of practice by
studying them. "The real law of competency," said Millemann,
"is in the traditions and values of lawyer-client relations, and in
the dialogue that arises out of personal relationships."
Millemann observed:
The problem in the professional responsibility course is the
divorce of values and action. The core [of what is taught in
professional responsibility] ought to be acting responsibly as
well as thinking about the rules that one is bound by. No one
can do this type of work until he is engaged in action. An or-
dinary classroom course does not ask students to act: to be
responsible or irresponsible and then to deal with the conse-
quences. We have disconnected the cognitive from the affec-
tive. Clinical education has an important role to play in the
teaching of professional responsibility.
Millemann concluded that clinical experience and classroom
based analysis both are essential to the successful teaching of
professional responsibility.
Professor Thomas Shaffer of Notre Dame Law School has ad-
vocated for many years that professional responsibility should be
principally a dialogue about moral values."0 Shaffer noted that
there is much discussion about what should be the goals of
teaching professional responsibility because "we have less of a
sense of what we are up to [than do people teaching in other
fields]. The object of the enterprise is unsettled. That is what
makes it fun." As to his own goals, Shaffer explained that the
purpose of teaching professional responsibility "ought to be eth-
ics itself." It should be a course "where people come together and
talk about the purpose and content of their morals, and attend
to one another without coercion."
The fundamental goal of teaching ethics, said Shaffer, is to
think about:
30. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT READINGS AND
DISCUSSION TOPICS (1985); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAW-
YERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR CoMMuNrrms (1991).
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What is a worthy human life? Is there some kind of dissonant
enterprise where we talk about living like a lawyer? That has
to be a subsidiary question, because if you can't be a lawyer
and live as a worthy person, then you should not be a lawyer.
Which has priority, conscience or the rules? If it is the rules,
the question is: are you clever enough to stay out of trouble?
Are there enough common values that you can conduct the
first enterprise?
Shaffer was unabashedly critical of those who identified the
teaching of law as the primary goal: "Constructing a course
around the law is a recipe for idolatry. It is not interesting
enough to be ethics. Some of it is in the same category as the
manual you read to get a driver's license." The advocates of
teaching the law of lawyering might observe that given the high
rate of injury and death from car accidents, this teaching of
rules is essential and requires greater attention. The same
might be said of the law that governs lawyers. Shaffer observed
that many law students desire analytical conclusions and that
some teachers emphasize the teaching of rules because they like
analytical conclusions. Shaffer noted that Socrates urged teach-
ers and students to abandon this goal. One way to move the dia-
logue of ethics classes beyond this logic game, he suggested, is to
work on ethical issues in clinics. "In the clinic," Shaffer said,
"students really do have to figure out what they want to do."
Professor Steven Hartwell of the University of San Diego
School of Law is principally a clinical teacher. Like Shaffer and
Millemann, his primary goal in teaching ethics is to advance
students' moral development by teaching ethics in the context of
lawyering experience."' Professor Hartwell placed the goals dis-
cussion on the template of Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral
development:32
31. See generally Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experi-
ential Teaching, 1 CLINIcAL L. REV. 505 (1995) (summarizing research results ob-
tained from teaching legal ethics courses over a six-year period and concluding that
an experiential, one-semester class in legal ethics can promote development of moral
reasoning).
32. Kohlberg posited that different people are at different stages of moral devel-
opment. See id& at 507-08. A stage one person might justify action by reference to
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Can there be a merger between personal morality and lawyer
morality? This takes us to Kohlberg stage four, where one
thinks that rules have a moral basis. Stage three is loyalty,
this is Watergate morality. Stage five allows for conflict be-
tween rules and personal morality. Stage five allows for civil
disobedience.
Hartwell shared the following story, which became a point of
reference throughout the conference:
I was telling my grandchildren one of their favorite stories,
the story of The Three Little Pigs. You will remember how,
once upon a time, there was a mother pig who had three lit-
tle pigs. They lived on the edge of the great forest along the
road that led to town. One day the mother pig said to her
sons: "Children, we have no more food to eat. You must leave
home and each of you must find your own way." She gave
each of them a clean shirt and a juicy apple wrapped in a red
handkerchief that she tied to the end of a stick. So prepared,
the three little pigs started down the road to town. Along the
way, they soon separated, each following his own path.
You will recall the rest of the story: how the first two pigs
built houses of straw and sticks that the wolf blew down so
that he could eat them. But the third little pig built a house
of brick which the wolf could not blow down. The wolf tries to
trick the third little pig to get him out of his house but each
time the pig is too clever. Finally, in desperation, the wolf
tries to enter through the chimney, but the little pig has
placed a pot of boiling water under the chimney which the
wolf falls into. The wolf is boiled alive. The little pig eats him
for dinner.
Several weeks ago, when I was at the point in the story
where the three little pigs separate, my granddaughter,
authority. See id. at 508. A person at stage two might justify action by reference to
gratification of wishes and needs. See id. at 509. A person at stage three might de-
cide what to do based on a desire for social approval or out of a sense of loyalty to
another. See id. A stage four thinker would make decisions about action by reference
to community norms. See id. at 510. A stage five person would refer also to moral
principles that require evaluation of both social and individual consequences. See i&
at 510-11. A stage six thinker might refer to some universal moral principles. See
id. at 511.
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Charlotte, [age four,] sat up in bed and said: "No, thats not
the story!"
I asked, "well, what is the story?"
She responded, "The pigs stay together and build a big
house with a big bedroom with three beds."
"Does the wolf come by?" I asked.
"Yes," she said.
"Do they let him in?" I asked.
"Yes," she said, "because he is hungry, lonely, and has no
friends."
"Does the wolf eat the pigs?" I asked.
"No," she responded, "not if they stay together."
The story says that we start life with connectedness. As
boys, especially, we are emotionally abandoned too early so
that we lose our sense of connectedness. We fear that to sur-
vive we must build brick walls around ourselves. We must
eat the enemy before he eats us.
Our present legal ethics is designed to accommodate the
traditional Three Little Pigs. We have lost our vision. We
need to unlearn these messages to know what it means to be
related and how to talk to each other. No one told Charlotte
her version of the story. I asked her parents explicitly. Sim-
ply put, Charlotte has not yet lost that vision.
Professor Hartwell illustrated this point with another story
that suggests that adopting the role of lawyer narrows the per-
ception and judgment of law students. Hartwell and a colleague,
Dr. Sharon Grodner, 3 taught a class in which they assigned
the students a problem relating to Model Rule 8.3,s the duty to
report professional misconduct to the disciplinary authorities.
33. Sharon Grodner, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, has been instrumental in de-
signing as well as teaching this and other exercises. As Adjunct Professor of Law,
she teaches a course in Interviewing and Counseling and another in Law and Psy-
chology of Gender. She also teaches gender and ethical issues to trial court judges
through the California Judicial Education and Research Project.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1995). This Rule titled
"Reporting Professional Misconduct," states in part: "A lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority."
Id. Rule 8.3(a).
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Hartwell and Grodner divided the class into pairs. In each pair,
one student played the role of a lawyer, and one student played
the role of a woman who previously had seen another attorney,
but had decided to get a new lawyer. Hartwell and Grodner gave
role instructions, and then each pair met for a ten-minute simu-
lated interview. Hartwell and Grodner told the clients that the
previous, male attorney had "overstepped professional bound-
aries." They told the "clients" that, if asked, "they"35 should ex-
plain that the "overstepping" consisted of a number of impropri-
eties. Each client was to explain that the male attorney asked
her to lunch and eventually barred his office door and said she
could not leave until the two of them "worked this out." If the
lawyer did not ask the client to explain "overstepping," Hartwell
and Grodner instructed the clients to say nothing about these
improprieties.
After the simulated interviews, Hartwell and Grodner de-
briefed the students. Some students who played lawyers said
that they did not want to know more about the improprieties.
Other "lawyers" said that they did not think the improprieties
were relevant. Still other students insisted that their clients
never said anything about "overstepping professional
boundaries." These students' clients responded to this comment
either with outrage or with laughter. 6
Professor Mary Daly of Fordham University School of Law
asked whether there were gender differences in the way men
and women played the roles." Professor Hartwell responded
that women who acted as "attorneys" were much more likely to
ask about the "overstepping." One woman playing the attorney
who had not asked about it later explained that she was asked
to play a male attorney, and she assumed that a male attorney
would not ask. Professor Hartwell added that when the lawyers
asked the clients if the conduct of the first attorney was a one-
time event or part of a pattern, the women who played clients
35. Both male and female students played the role of the female client.
36. Professor Hartwell now has done this exercise four times in different courses.
He has had similar results each time. The collective group of participants numbers
about 100.
37. See Mary Daly, Remarks at the W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics (Mar. 21, 1997).
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overwhelmingly said it was a pattern. The men who played at-
torneys generally believed that the improper conduct toward the
client was a one-time event.
Professor Hartwell commented:
The exercise is not about moral reasoning, which is our typi-
cal focus of academic interest, but about moral perception.
Most of us are able to figure out some reasonably moral con-
duct when the problem is laid out for us. The exercise is de-
signed to help teach perception, where we must first see. In
this sense, it is closer to art than science.
II. THE PEDAGOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE GOALS DISCUSSION
One could construct a continuum of teaching goals for legal
ethics. At one end of the continuum are teachers who focus ex-
clusively on the teaching of positive law. At the other end are
teachers who aspire to teach moral perception or moral judg-
ment. For example, a teacher interested in teaching positive law
would aspire to familiarize the students with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and to prepare them to take the MPRE.
Toward the middle of the spectrum would be a teacher who
teaches all of the law governing lawyers, including not only ethi-
cal rules and their interpretation in disciplinary opinions and
ethics opinions, but malpractice law, relevant criminal law, court
rules, and other bodies of law that govern lawyers."8 This
teacher might eschew the use of problems and video dramatiza-
tions and focus principally on teaching substantive law and its
application.
Toward the moral perception end of the continuum one might
find a teacher who recognizes the vast morass of law governing
lawyers, but who opts for depth rather than breadth. This
teacher would select topics from law governing lawyers and use
problems and videos that require students to apply and discuss,
i.e., internalize, the process of identifying and evaluating ethical
dilemmas.
38. The newly expanded scope of the MPRE would encompass most or all of the
law governing lawyers-this may lead to the disappearance of the narrow end of the
spectrum.
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At the moral perception end of the continuum one might find
a few experienced teachers who have backgrounds in moral phi-
losophy or psychology and who have spent a great deal of time
thinking about what really matters in educating future lawyers.
They might have concluded that teaching students how to think
about moral dilemmas is more important than covering any par-
ticular body of legal doctrine. They might believe that an experi-
ential learning environment is necessary to engage students in
the development of moral judgment. Some of these teachers
have carved out niches in which they can teach small
experientially-oriented seminars in which students learn the law
that governs lawyers as they develop their skills in moral per-
ception, moral reasoning, and moral judgment. These courses
become demonstration projects; their teachers are invited to
present their pedagogy at conferences attended by professors
who teach the large required courses.
Each of the panelists' teaching goals include both transmis-
sion of knowledge of the law of lawyering and the development
of students' skill in moral judgment. Differences among the pan-
elists are in emphasis and methodology, not in fundamental
goals. Some panelists have published works examining the vari-
ous experimental approaches to teaching legal ethics. 9 The fol-
lowing discussion synthesizes some of their work and their com-
ments during the panel discussion.
Professor Maute and Dean Moody share the concerns about
moral development and moral judgment articulated by the other
panelists. Their approaches appear to differ only in emphasis
and focus. Professor Maute has spent years on the MPRE Draft-
ing Committee considering what students need to know about
the law governing lawyers in order to pass the bar. Dean Moody,
as a former member of the MPRE Drafting Committee and as
the Chair of the Review Panel for the new MPRE specifications,
also wants to ensure that all licensed lawyers have mastered
39. See, e.g., Hartwell, supra note 31; Luban & Millemann, supra note 1; James
E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibili-
ty, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 71 (1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics
in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (1996); Christine Mary Venter, En-
couraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative Approach to Teaching Legal Ethics,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 287.
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certain basic values and boundaries. Dean Moody and Professor
Maute have taught both large and small classes in professional
responsibility. They are concerned with how to convey a complex
body of law in a manner that will foster competent representa-
tion of clients.
In recent years, Professor Millemann has taught a profession-
al responsibility course with Professor David Luban. The course
combines
a full classroom legal ethics course of two or three credit
hours with a multicredit clinical course in which students,
under faculty supervision, and faculty, with student critique,
represent clients. In addition to the expected classroom
hours, students meet weekly in clinical rounds (a second set
of classes), in which they and the teachers discuss ethical
issues arising in their clinical work.4°
The two teachers reorganize the ethics syllabus throughout each
semester so that issues can be covered in class during weeks in
which related issues arise in the clinical work.4
The premise of Luban and Millemann's course is that "moral
judgment (judgment about right and wrong) can be taught
through practice. And... the best way to teach legal ethics-the
only way to teach legal ethics that incorporates the all-important
element of moral judgment-is clinically."42 Clinical teaching
without a focus on ethics will not accomplish this purpose.
Luban and Millemann believe that:
[Insisting on an overlay of theoretical reflection on the un-
dercoating of habit is vitally important for clinical teaching.
Precisely because clinical education is a more powerful culti-
vator of affect and judgment than the classroom, it runs a
heightened danger of being a corrupter of youth unless clini-
cians systematically build into their teaching the capacity for
reflection and self-critique .... ."
40. Luban & Millemann, supra note 1, at 64.
41. See id. at 65.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 63.
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Luban and Millemann highlight the problem in clinical teach-
ing of "excessive engagement," in which the immediacy and in-
tensity of the representational work interferes with a student's
ability to detach and reflect on the issues at hand." They re-
port a degree of success in the hybrid clinic and ethics course in
accomplishing "[mioral learning through practice and imitation"
in which an ongoing dialogue ensures that the students are "an-
swerable for their choices."45
Until recently, Professor Shaffer taught exclusively classroom
based courses. In recent years, he moved his office into the clini-
cal program at Notre Dame, where he teaches a seminar in legal
ethics to clinic students.4" As in Luban and Millemann's course
at the University of Maryland,47 the students' clinical experi-
ence becomes the basis for study and dialogue in the seminar.48
Unlike most traditional professional responsibility classes, stu-
dents make decisions on the basis of the discussion and act on
them.4"
In an article about teaching ethics in the clinic, Professor
Shaffer noted that the attempt to foster moral dialogue in the
clinic was more successful than in classroom courses that lacked
an experiential component.0 He observed that the clinical expe-
rience allowed the students to "push past some of the modern
barriers to moral discourse."5 Shaffer characterized some of
these barriers as the "interpersonal tactics of evasion,"52 which
include:
(1) silence, on virtually all deep moral questions; or, when
discussion is not easily avoidable, (2) responses that go no
44. See id. at 83-87.
45. Id. at 87.
46. For a description and evaluation of this pedagogical structure, see Shaffer,
supra note 39 and Thomas L. Shaffer, Surprised by Joy on Howard Street, in LA-
BORS FROM THE HEART 221 (Mark L. Poorman ed., 1996).
47. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
48. See Shaffer, supra note 39, at 613.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 609.
51. Id. at 606.
52. Id. at 607.
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further than court rules; or-the most common of all moral
conclusions in modern America--(3) the dogma that what
makes behavior bad or good, right or wrong, is the choice of
the moral agent: Every person is her own tyrant.53
Shaffer attempted to "export th[e] communal quality of moral
discourse"" that he was able to cultivate in the clinical ethics
seminars by including other students who were not enrolled in
the clinic in some classes.5 Ethical dilemmas encountered in
the clinic were a primary focus of discussion.56 This approach
was not very successful. Professor Christine Venter, who taught
some of these courses, explained:
[Tihe dynamics are altered when facts have to be changed
and identities concealed to protect confidentiality.... [Also],
students who do not work actively with clients do not come to
know the realities of clients' lives and problems."
Shaffer observed that "what we have proved with our clinical
ethics seminars is that much more of legal education-maybe all
of it-should be as 'hands on' as our law office ethics discussions
are."
5 8
Unlike Shaffer and Millemann, Professor Hartwell uses simu-
lation rather than clinical experience as the basis for reflective
dialogue. He recently published an empirical study conducted
over three semesters in professional responsibility classes on
whether moral reasoning can be taught in a law school class. 9
Hartwell's professional responsibility students filled out
questionaires that measured their moral reasoning in relation-
ship to Kohlberg's stages of moral development at the beginning
53. Id.
54. Id. at 617.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id. (quoting Venter, supra note 39, at 293 (footnote omitted)).
58. Id.
59. See Hartwell, supra note 31. In his article, Hartwell described the first of the
three semesters in which he conducted the study. See id. at 522-24. Hartwell made
some changes to the course in the two subsequent semesters. See id. at 524-26.
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and the end of the semester." The courses included "a series of
out-of-class attorney-client simulations in which the students
confronted various ethical dilemmas. Some of the exercises were
quite elaborate, involving four or more students meeting several
times during the week."6' During the classes that followed
these simulations, Hartwell divided the students into small
groups and instructed them to engage in reflective discussions
about the simulations and to construct rules that would address
the ethical issues raised.62 The small groups then reported their
results to the class.' Hartwell spent over half of the semester's
class time on these exercises.'
During all three of the semesters in which Hartwell conducted
the study, the students' scores on the moral development ques-
tionnaire, the Defining Issues Test (DIT), were substantially
higher at the end of the semester than at the beginning of the
semester.' Reviewing the test results, Hartwell noted: "The
DIT results indicate that the experientially taught professional
responsibility courses significantly and positively influenced the
level of moral reasoning of the students ... . The positive
change was maintained for at least four months after the end of
[the third] course .. ."66
Professor Hartwell considered whether the impact on the
students' moral reasoning would occur equally in other simula-
tion courses.6 He administered the questionaire to five other
groups of students, some in his Negotiations course and others
in his Interviewing & Counseling courses." The students'
60. See id. at 511-12, 524.
61. Id. at 522-23.
62. See id. at 523.
63. See id.
64. See i&L
65. See id. at 527. The DIT presents six different scenarios and asks questions
about what moral reasoning would be most important in resolving each scenario. See
id. at 511-12. The mean score for the first course was 51.8 at the beginning of the
semester and 61.8 at the end. See id. at 524. For the second course, the mean score
was 44.35 at the beginning of the semester and 58.37 at the end. See id. at 526.
The mean score for the third course was 40 at the beginning of the semester and
50.2 at the end of the semester. See id. at 527. In each course, therefore, the
students' average scores increased by at least 10 points by the end of the semester.
66. Id. at 527.
67. See id.
68. See id. Hartwell administered the test in the Negotiations course three times
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scores on the moral reasoning assessment in these other courses
did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the
semester.6 9 This result suggests that experiential learning with-
out moral dialogue does not affect moral reasoning skills, where-
as experiential learning coupled with moral dialogue may bene-
fit moral reasoning skills.
Hartwell's study is exploratory rather than definitive, but it
strongly suggests that students' moral reasoning capacity may
be affected by experience in law school classes. In other words,
perhaps virtue can be taught. Hartwell hypothesized that these
classes "affect[ed] the students as significantly as they did" be-
cause they provided an opportunity for true "moral discourse."70
"In moral discourse," Hartwell explained, "the method is self-
revelation and the goal is self-knowledge: students cooperate
together to understand mutually what each is saying with the
goal of revealing to themselves and others their moral positions
and moral reasoning."71 He identified small group work, role-
playing, and bonds of trust and affection between the students
as ingredients that made moral discourse possible.7"
The Hartwell study invites us to learn more about whether
and how moral reasoning and moral judgment 3 can be taught
in a law school environment. In addition to thinking about our
teaching goals and about what methods will best accomplish our
goals, we should attempt to assess the impact of our teaching, to
find out whether, in fact, we have taught what we set out to
teach.
and in the Interviewing & Counseling course twice. See id. at 527-28.
69. See id. at 528.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
72. See id. at 531-32. For another view on factors that contribute to the creation
of a good learning environment for the teaching of professional responsibility, see
Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Educa-
tional Reform, LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 139, 140-48.
73. Luban and Millemann argued that the focus in teaching ethics should be on
the development of students' skill in moral judgment, which "represents the faculty
of evaluating particulars," rather than moral reasoning, which involves "reasoning
about principles." Luban & Millemann, sipra note 1, at 83 n.186. Although Luban
and Millemann had difficulty "imagin[ing] what an empirical index of moral judg-
ment would be," id. at 83, perhaps others will identify or create such an instrument
and investigate the impact of teaching on students' moral judgment.
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III. COMMENTARY
The panelists and many other speakers at the conference ex-
pressed different versions of a common view that legal ethics
should be taught in small experientially-based seminars.
Through the use of pedagogy that combines live-client or simu-
lated learning with regular opportunity for critical reflective con-
versation and writing about the ethical issues, professors can
lead students to engage much more deeply in thinking about
ethical dilemmas. Through this process, students will develop
their skills in moral reasoning and moral judgment.
Experientially-oriented ethics teaching is not just desirable; it
is essential.74 This type of teaching, however, is so resource in-
tensive that it is entirely out of step with the dominant struc-
ture of legal education in the United States. To understand how
badly additional teaching resources are needed to teach ethics
and professionalism, it is useful to explore some of the dynamics
in law school culture and in large professional responsibility
classes that make it difficult to teach the law governing lawyers
or to engage the students in a moral dialogue.
A. Law School Culture: The Individual in the Educational
Factory
With apologies to the real Charlotte,75 I suggest that we fol-
low Charlotte after she grows up. Perhaps she will go to law
school, following in her grandfather's footsteps. If the law school
of 2015 is anything like our current institutions, Charlotte will
arrive eager for the intellectual challenge, a little nervous about
keeping up, but determined to do her very best. If offered the
opportunity for moral discussion about the conduct of lawyers
during her first semester of law school, Charlotte and her class-
mates may engage with real interest and openness.76 After her
74. Much recent discussion has focused on an observed decline in professionalism
among lawyers and a need for law schools and bar associations to invest significant
resources to address this problem. See, e.g., PROFESSIONALISM COMM., supra note 14.
75. See supra pp. 466-67.
76. I often introduce ethical issues into discussion of cases and problems in my
first-semester contracts class. I have observed that the first-semester students re-
spond with great interest to these discussions. Stephen Bundy, however, reported
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first semester, Charlotte's interest in moral dialogue may decline
gradually and be replaced by a cynical, instrumental view of
lawyering. Meanwhile, she may develop a professional style that
projects a high degree of poise and control and a noticeable ab-
sence of vulnerability.17 If this pattern develops, she may wait
until her third year to take professional responsibility, focusing
instead on more "serious" courses. Once enrolled in a legal ethics
class, she may view the discussion of hypothetical problems as
"mushy" and "indeterminate" and perhaps even "a waste of
time."
What happened to Charlotte? Perhaps she abandoned some
human perceptions and values in favor of some "legal" ones.
Hartwell's simulation exercise suggests that becoming a lawyer
for many students includes the acquisition of a kind of moral
myopia, the donning of role-based blinders." Law students
learn to screen out some facts as irrelevant. They become less
concerned with context and more concerned with rule applica-
tion. In their evaluation of what to do, they may restrict the
questions they ask to those they believe are appropriate to their
roles as lawyers.79 Professor Hartwell's students playing the
that when he taught a legal ethics course to first-year students at Berkeley, he en-
countered some cynical and alienated students in first-year classes. See Bundy, supra
note 4, at 25.
77. This description of the changes that might occur during law school is based on
impressions of the changes that I have observed in some of my students. Research
suggests that female law students, in particular, learn to think about problems in a
more rule-oriented and less care-oriented manner than they did before they entered
law school. See Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning,
76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 194 n.3 (1995). Psychologist Sandra Janoff conducted a study
on the change in the moral reasoning processes of male and female law students
during their first year at Temple School of Law. See id. at 208-09. She concluded
that:
Women enter law school predominantly oriented to the web of inter-
personal relationships rather than to a hierarchy of abstract principles.
However, after one year of learning about a structure that emphasizes
rights and rules within a learning environment that is congruent with
that content, women express their connectedness to others less frequently
but their objectivity and separateness more frequently.
Id. at 238.
78. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 5-8 (1975).
79. Professor Hartwell urged participants to read a book on lawyers and morality
by Rand Jack and Dana Crowley Jack called MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DE-
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roles of lawyers were reluctant to investigate possible miscon-
duct by a fellow member of the bar or to think that the client's
problem warranted serious attention."
Why? The students are not yet in practice, not yet constrained
by professional or social relationships with the other lawyers at
issue. Perhaps the disinclination is that the client has come to
the lawyer seeking help on another matter, so the possible mis-
conduct of the lawyer simply is not on the agenda.8' But per-
haps their response reflects an acquired disinclination to care
about what sounds like a complex personal problem.
For many students, going to law school is a rite of passage into
adulthood. The students buy suits, get their hair cut, and learn
how to project self-confidence. They learn to manage time, to
reduce or eliminate frivolous activity, to build their resumes, and
to measure up to external standards. They are taught mainly in
large groups by teachers who may or may not know their names.
Professors ask each student to read the same pages of the same
books as scores of other students. Law professors grade exams
anonymously and give little feedback on exam performance.
CISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989). The book
reports the authors' study of lawyers' moral thinking through in-depth interviews
with 36 lawyers. See id. at xi-xiii. The comments of the interviewed lawyers offer
many examples of this kind of role-based thinking. One such example is a statement
by Brent Stephens about his responsibility in representing a criminal defendant who
had confessed to a murder:
You're the hired gun for this guy and you have the duty, obligation to
represent him, which includes preparation of a defense to the charges. If
there's a chance of excluding the confession, then you've got to do that.
The other side of the dilemma I see is . . . of his dangerousness to soci-
ety. I've never had too much trouble with that fact situation, because I
didn't make the rules that you play by. The government did ....
Id. at 22-23 (quoting Brent Stephens).
80. See, e.g., supra pp. 467-69.
81. Professor Teresa Collett asked whether the students had prior training in cli-
ent counseling and noted that in her course, in which students counsel terminally ill
patients, "it takes at least a month to persuade the students that there is no
unaskable question." Teresa Collett, Remarks at W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on
the Teaching of Legal Ethics (Mar. 21, 1997). During the panel discussion, Hartwell
reported that the students had some prior training in client counseling. With addi-
tional training, more of the students might have pursued the clients comment about
her bad experience with her previous lawyer. Even so, the failure of many students
to inquire into the matter and the claims of some students that the client had not
spoken of her discomfort with the previous lawyer is significant.
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The large class structure of legal education communicates an
important institutional message to the students. The message is
that individuals and their problems do not really matter. Con-
sider the position of law professors as role models.82 Our stu-
dents are our clients. For many students, law professors are the
first lawyers they meet and observe. In our conduct toward our
students, we model a set of values about the relationship of pro-
fessional to client.' Even before the students become lawyers
and represent clients, they will mirror the values we model in
their conduct toward us and toward one another. We do not
teach in a way that respects individual identity." Should we be
surprised, then, that the students' thinking becomes more rule-
oriented and less care-oriented,' or that they tend to pay too
much attention to law and not enough attention to facts? Per-
haps the structure of legal education is responsible for the ob-
servable decline in moral sensitivity among law students as they
matriculate.86
Some of the difficulties in teaching legal ethics may be caused
by these problems in the institutional culture and value systems
of our law schools. If we aspire to inculcate professionalism to
assist students to remain or to become "moral persons,"" we
need to pay more attention to individuals. The learning environ-
ment should be one that attends to the educational experience
and the professional development of each student." The educa-
82. Professor Thomas Morgan urged that, although most of our students do not
aspire to become law professors, they "do want to live a professional life of which
they can be proud. The effort to do that is something that law teachers model-for
better or worse. The traits we hope they model have been called by some writers
'virtues.'" Thomas D. Morgan, Law Faculty as Role Models, 1997 A.B. SEC. LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 37, 38.
83. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Eth-
ics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 6-9 (1991) (discussing negative messages about ethics and
professionalism communicated by law professors through conduct modeled in class).
84. See Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Appli-
cation of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 514, 520 (1978).
85. See supra note 77.
86. See, e.g., supra pp. 467-69.
87. See supra text accompanying note 45.
88. Many other schools, colleges, and graduate programs focus on individual devel-
opment. The Montgomery County Public Schools, for example, have a program titled
"Success for Every Student" that includes initiatives to focus attention on cultivating
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tional structure should foster cooperation, connection, and com-
munity. Curricular changes that increase opportunities for aca-
demic or professional counseling or for tutorial teaching human-
ize the law school environment. The growth of clinics, externship
programs, and simulation courses has been beneficial. 9 Law
students, nevertheless, spend most of their class time in large
classes.90 In those large classes, our "clients" receive little indi-
vidual attention.
B. Academic Politesse: The Ordinary Deception of the
Educational Factory
In many professional responsibility classes, the communica-
tion between teacher and students is obstructed by a dynamic
we might call "academic politesse." The students pretend that
they want to learn the material and that they are doing the
reading, attending class regularly, and taking the course seri-
ously. In reality, many of them are quite disengaged from the
course.9' By their third year, law students are accustomed to
the skills, interests, and talents of each individual student in the public school sys-
tem. See Dan Beyers, Schools Emphasize Test Scores, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1996, at
Md. 1.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
90. As of 1990, one survey reported that "clinical programs are generally available
to only 30% of law students at schools where live client clinics are offered" and that
"professional skills training occupies only nine (9%) percent of the total instructional
time available to law schools." TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDU-
CATIONAL CONTINUUM 241 (1992); Maijorie Anne McDiarmid, What's Going on Down
There in the Basement: In-House Clinics Expand their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 239, 280-81 (1990) (providing data illustrating the limited clinical space at most
law schools).
91. In the spring semester of 1997, I taught a very demanding five-credit seminar
in which the students were required to turn in reflective writing and other assign-
ments every week. When students turned in assignments late, I brought their tardi-
ness to their attention. The students commented to me about how different my ex-
pectations were from those of their other teachers. In my seminar, they had to do
substantial work throughout the semester. I told them about my observation that in
many classes the students and the teachers pretend that the students are doing the
reading, while everyone really knows what is going on. They responded with a loud,
embarrassed, collective guffaw. I do not know whether they were surprised that I
knew about "academic politesse" or whether they were just surprised that I would
mention it.
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classes in which the teachers do not particularly care whether
they do the reading or come to class92 and in which they can
obtain passing grades by studying at the end of the semester.
This pattern simply becomes more pronounced in professional
responsibility classes than in other upper-level courses.
Some teachers tacitly concur in this "academic politesse" as a
kind of survival strategy. They might have students sign up to
participate in the discussion on particular days or call on stu-
dents predictably, going down the rows in the classroom so that
each day five percent of the class will be on notice of the need
actually to do the reading. Other teachers rely principally on
students who volunteer to participate and spend the semester in
dialogue with the ten percent of the students who are unusually
conscientious or interested in the course.
Deliberate deception of teachers is common in law school
classes, including ethics classes. The student who is unprepared
when called on, but who attempts to bluff her way through a
dialogue is engaged in deception. So is the student who sits in a
different seat to feign absence when unprepared. So is a student
who sits in one class trying to appear to be engaged, but who in
fact is reading her assignment for her next class. Some law stu-
dents attend class very little, feeling that they have better
things to do. Those who know that class attendance93 is re-
quired are also engaged in a kind of chronic deception.
A teacher who pretends not to notice that students are not
doing the reading or are not attending class enables the decep-
tion. This kind of behavior conveys a confusing message, which
92. Law teachers express this lack of concern in different ways. Some law
teachers take the position that the students are adults, and as adults they are re-
sponsible for making their own decisions about whether to read or come to class. As
long as they are prepared to accept the consequences, they can make their own de-
cisions. Other law teachers articulate some distress about the low level of attendance
and preparation, but despair of any possibility of affecting it. A typical attitude ex-
pressed is that: "Everyone knows third-year students do not study very much." A
third variant is a law teacher who believes that his responsibility simply is to pres-
ent the material. He has better things to do than to worry about whether the stu-
dents are doing their homework.
93. The academic rules of every accredited law school require class attendance for
students to receive credit for a course. See STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS Standard 304(c) (1996) (requiring regular class attendance).
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the students perceive quite clearly. If it were stated, it would go
something like this:
I am giving you reading assignments for each class, and I
know that most of you are not going to do the reading, at
least not more than skimming the material, which will not
enable even a minimal understanding of it. I don't want to
embarrass you or myself, so I will structure class in a way
that will not expose the unprepared majority. You will help
me by being sure to do the reading on those few days when
you are "on deck," and I will leave you alone otherwise.
This is similar to a message that students receive during and
after law school about the ethical rules and about the law that
governs lawyers. If stated, it would go something like this:
There are all these formalistic ethical rules, and, of course,
we in the legal profession are supposed to comply with them,
but some of them are ridiculous. Take the "tattle-tale" rule
for example.94 Almost no one turns in another lawyer. It
would be professional suicide. Or turning in your client if he
lies on the stand? Hah. Do you think you would ever get your
fee? You have to know the difference between the real rules
and the fluff. Stay away from your trust account and you'll be
okay.
Because professional responsibility classes deal with ethical
issues, "academic politesse" produces an extra layer of awkward-
ness between the teacher and the students. The patterns of low
attendance and preparation are more conspicuous in these class-
es than in others. Also, because the course examines issues of
professional conduct, the teachers tend to want students to con-
duct themselves in a professional manner by reading and coming
to class. Often there is sharp divergence between the teacher's
expectations and the students' conduct. If the teacher calls at-
tention to the students' poor performance, she risks increasing
the level of cynicism and alienation. But if the teacher avoids
overt attention to low levels of attendance and preparation for
94. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.3 (1995).
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class, she is colluding in the pretense. The structure of the situa-
tion, to say the least, is not conducive to meaningful teaching.
In addition to the unspoken deception that occurs in profes-
sional responsibility classes, sometimes there is overt cynicism.
In some classes, there is a group in the back of the classroom,
usually men: the "peanut gallery." Their self-appointed task is to
throw verbal tomatoes during class. They deride conversations
about values and treat the law governing lawyers as if it was
not law, but just advice given by sissies. In one of my classes, for
example, I was leading a discussion of an ABA Formal Opinion
on lawyer billing practices.95 I pointed out the assertion in the
opinion that billing two clients for one block of time is unethi-
cal.96 "That can't be right," blurted a voice from the back of the
room. "I know that's okay, because people at my firm do that all
the time." Other students agreed. I experienced a familiar bind.
An argumentative student had made a categorical, though incor-
rect, assertion. His buddies backed him up. My options were 1)
to expose the flaws in his reasoning, 2) to acknowledge the fa-
miliar gap between law and practice, or 3) to invite the rest of
the class to comment on this statment. None of the available op-
tions could remedy the tension and hostility, visible in this com-
ment, that was produced by requiring unwilling students to sit
through this course during their last semester of law school.
Some students express their resentment about being required
to take professional responsibility by chattering during class. In
one class the back row became so noisy that I left a note in the
mailbox of one student who appeared to be a ringleader.
"Come see me at once," it said. He did.
"I feel as if I've been called to the principal's office," he said.
"You have," I said.
"I assume you want to graduate?" I asked.
"I do," he said.
"Then I assume you want to stay in my class?" I asked.
"Of course," he said.
"If you want to stay in my class, you need not only to stop
95. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379
(1993).
96. See id.
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your own disruptive behavior, but to get your friends to cut it
out also."
"I'm sorry," he said. His fiancee was a teacher; I think he un-
derstood my situation. When confronted with my reaction to his
behavior, he acceded to my request. The chatter stopped. I found
this nose-to-nose confrontation refreshing. I spoke candidly to
the student about what I observed; he acknowledged the prob-
lem. We abandoned "academic politesse" and stepped into a
more direct relationship.
Overcoming "academic politesse" is an important challenge for
teachers of professional responsibility. One way to achieve this
goal is to evaluate student performance throughout the semes-
ter, to make the students accountable for their class preparation
and participation in the course. Any meaningful evaluation of
students in a large class is a time-intensive proposition. Ministe-
rial monitoring, on the other hand, by asking students to turn in
attendance records or reading logs, does not lead to any mean-
ingful engagement between teacher and student and may be
perceived as patronizing. The choices are not satisfactory. The
only good option is to teach professional responsibility to smaller
classes.
C. Implementing Expensive Ideas with Limited Resources
The economics of legal education is premised on a high stu-
dent/teacher ratio. This works particularly badly in the teaching
of ethics. Even so, the institutional structure is such that curric-
ular reform in this arena is difficult. Like teaching law students
to write well, most law professors agree that teaching legal eth-
ics is important, but few schools are willing to commit the neces-
sary resources.
A law faculty that wishes to upgrade its ethics curriculum
might retain or expand the current required ethics course to en-
sure broad exposure to the law governing lawyers. It might also
add to the curriculum a second ethics course-an experientially-
oriented seminar-in which the primary goal would be the de-
velopment of moral sensitivity and moral judgment through dia-
logue about live or simulated lawyering experience. The primary
focus would be on ethical issues raised in simulation, in live-cli-
ent experience, or in fieldwork at organizations outside the law
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school. To offer such a seminar to a class of 300 students, a law
school would need to offer twenty sections of the seminar. The
coverage of these two courses would require a commitment of
the equivalent of five or six full-time faculty."
Serious thinking about the educational goals of the teaching of
professional responsibility leads to recommendations that cannot
be implemented without substantial additional resources. One
cannot set meaningful teaching goals without thinking about
their implementation. After confronting the boundaries imposed
by limited resources, the goals must be reshaped to fit the avail-
able resources. At most schools, the best scenario for the devel-
opment of the legal ethics curriculum will be incremental
change. Here are a few options that could be implemented by
the initiative of one or two law teachers.
Teach an ethics course to clinic students: Propose to teach
professional responsibility to students enrolled in a clinic in col-
laboration with the teacher who supervises the students' work.
Construct the seminar around the issues that arise in- the clinic,
attending at the same time to coverage of a predetermined body
of material."
Teach an ethics course in an externship seminar: Many schools
give academic credit to a large number of students who do field-
work at legal organizations in their communities. Many schools
offer seminars to foster reflective discussion and writing about the
field experience. Even if the students are in diverse placements,
the fieldwork provides a body of lawyering experience on which an
ethics teacher might draw to better engage a group of students.99
97. This assumes each full-time teacher could teach four sections of the seminar
per year. A possible alternative, of course, would be to hire adjuncts to teach these
seminars, perhaps trained and supervised by a full-time teacher. This might solve
the resources problem but would be unlikely to allow the pedagogical quality that
can be cultivated over years by full-time faculty whose teaching is a central focus of
their work.
98. Most clinical courses are structured to encourage careful attention to ethical
dilemmas that arise in cases. This work could be done more effectively in combina-
tion with a course designed to teach the law governing lawyers more systematically.
Also, some clinical teachers tend to focus on the counseling, strategic, or supervisory
aspects of ethical dilemmas and may not be as aware of the relevant law as an eth-
ics teacher would be. For an example of this different emphasis, see A Teacher's
Trouble: Risk, Responsibility and Rebellion, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 315 (1995).
99. A forthcoming book from West Publishing, which I coauthored, presents teach-
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Teach a Professional Responsibility class with limited enroll-
ment: It is more possible to conduct simulation exercises and to
facilitate moral dialogue in a class of thirty students than in a
class of eighty. A law school that cannot afford to offer all of its
ethics classes in seminar format might allow a teacher to offer
an experimental small section of professional responsibility.
Teach an ethics seminar in conjunction with a simulation
course: Students in trial advocacy or negotiation courses inevita-
bly encounter ethical issues in the course of their work. Many
simulation courses have such a heavy skill-development agenda
that there is not enough time or credit to focus readings, discus-
sion, and reflective writing around exploration of the ethical is-
sues. A piggybacking arrangement (in which an ethics course is
paired with a simulation course) could provide a resource-efficient
method of expanding the experiential teaching of legal ethics.
Teach a specialized Professional Responsibility course: Profes-
sor Bruce Green of Fordham University School of Law explained
in his presentation at the conference some of the many benefits
of developing specialized ethics courses.' 0 A substantive focus
may better promote moral judgment through experiential
learning. Narrowing the coverage agenda allows more time for
experiential classroom exercises. In addition, giving students a
selection of specialized legal ethics courses from which to choose
may increase motivation and reduce the sense of coercion that
erodes the learning environment in many professional responsi-
bility classes. A specialized course may draw a lower enrollment,
another pedagogical boon.
CONCLUSION
As a profession, we express our aspirations in our codes of
ethics. Some of our most important goals as educators of lawyers
are relegated to implementation through the teaching of courses
on the legal profession and on the law governing lawyers. To
ing materials that could be used in an externship seminar. See J.P. OGILVY ET AL.,
LEARNING FROM PRACTIcE: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL EXTERNS
(forthcoming 1998).
100. See Bruce Green, Remarks at the W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics (Mar. 21, 1997).
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teach our students to become "reflective practitioners" who re-
tain and develop their moral perception and their moral judg-
ment, law schools must encourage the pervasive teaching of le-
gal ethics. They must invest additional resources in the devel-
opment of the ethics curriculum to include a set of smaller class-
es in which students can engage in moral dialogue about live or
simulated lawyering experience.
